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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID GALLEGOS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 960091-CA 
Priority No. 2 
SUPPLEMENT BRIEF FOR APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a conviction of two counts of Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, third degree felonies in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8 (1953, as 
amended) and one count of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37a-5(l) (1953, as amended). The Appellant was 
convicted of the above charges after a jury trial, on the 18th day of December, 1995, the 
Honorable Michael D. Lyon, presiding. On February 1,1996, the Defendant was sentenced 
to serve two indeterminate terms of zero to five years on the convictions of Possession of 
a Controlled Substance, and six months on the conviction of Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia. These terms were ordered to be served concurrent to each other, but 
consecutive to any other sentences previously imposed. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this 
Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(f) (1953, as amended) and Rule 26 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The trial court erred in denying trial counsel's Motion to Suppress since the area at 
the threshold of the closet was not within Mr. Gallegos' reach and the presence of Deputy 
Zwemke in that area was not lawful thus negating a fiinding of "plain view". 
2. Trial counsel advocated a more restrictive interpretation of the lanuage of "on or 
about his person" as found in §77-7-9 and the trial court erred in not adopting such 
interpretation. 
3. The trial court, in the alternative, correctly ruled that the drugs found in the closet 
were admissible under the "plain view" exception to the warrant requirement. 
4. The district court commited "plain error" in not sua sponte finding that the evidence 
found in the closet was inadmissible. 
4. Trial counsel acted so deficiently, in failing to re-assert or move for the suppression 
of evidence of methamphetamine and cocaine found in the closet after the testimony of 
Deputy Zwemke, that it denied the Appellant his right to effective assistance of counsel. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. The trial court's factual findings underlying its decision to grant or deny a 
motion to suppress evidence are viewed for clear error. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 
(Utah 1994). The standard applied to the conclusions of law is reviewed nondeferentially 
for correctness. Pena, 869 P.2d at 939. 
2. Interpretation of the language of "on or about his person" as found in §77-7-9 
will be reviewed for correctness. 
2 
3. The trial court's factual finding underlying its decision to grant or deny a 
motion to suppress evidence are viewed for clear error. The standard applied to the 
conclusions of law is reviewed for correctness. 
4. Where Appellant alleges for the first time on appeal of error by the trial court, 
the Appellate Court will utilize a "plain error" standard of review. State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 
170,174 (Utah App.1992). To establish plain error, defendant must show that: "(i) An error 
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). An error is harmful if, "absent 
the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome" for the defendant, 
or "our confidence in the verdict is undermined." Id. at 1208-09. 
5. Where ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on appeal, 
the Appellate Court must determine as a matter of law whether the Appellant was denied 
effective assistance of counsel. State v. Callahan, 866 P.2d 590 (Utah App. 1993). 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The Appellant identifies the following constitutional provision, statutes, ordinances 
and rules as those "whose interpretation is determinative" within the meaning of Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a)(6): 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AMENDMENT VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed 
of the nature and cause of the accusations; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; 
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance 
of counsel for his defense. 
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AMENDMENT XIV, SECTION I 
All person born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United State and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within the jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws. 
UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION 
ARTICLE 1, SECTION 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
ARTICLE 1, SECTION 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to 
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor 
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense. 
ARTICLE 1, SECTION 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue 
but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
SECTION 77-7-9 
Any person making an arrest may seize from the person arrested all weapons which 
he may have on or about his person. 
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NATURE OF THE CASE 
In a multiple count information, dated August 8, 1995, the State charged Appellant 
with one count of Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Person, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (1953, as amended), two counts Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8 (1953, 
as amended), and one count of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37a5(l) (1953, as amended). A preliminary hearing was 
held on August 15, 1995, before the Honorable W. Brent West, in which, the State called 
three witnesses, Chet Hartley, Matt Zwemke, both of the Weber County Sheriffs Office, 
and Corina Passillas. Upon testimony before the court, W. Brent West found that there was 
probable cause to believe that Mr. Gallegos committed the crimes as charged. The 
Appellant, through trial counsel, filed a Motion to Suppress evidence obtained at the time 
of his arrest, namely, a firearm found between the mattress and box spring, cocaine and 
methamphetamine found in a tin box in the closet. State respond with their own response 
to Appellant's motion. 
At the hearing on the Motion to Suppress, no witnesses were called, instead both 
Appellant's trial counsel and the State argued the Motion after the trial court judge, the 
Honorable Michael D. Lyon, had a chance to listen to the preliminary hearing tape. See, 
Addendum D, attached. Trial counsel argued that under Article I Section 14 and Utah 
Code Ann. §77-7-9 (1953, as amended) the search of the area between the box spring and 
mattress as well as the closet was unlawful. See, Addendum D, pgs 2-8. Trial counsel 
argued that the search of those aforementioned areas was outside the scope he exception 
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to the warrant requirement codified in §77-7-9. The State argued that under the United 
States Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court that the search of 
the area between the box spring and mattress was acceptable as a search incident to an 
arrest. See, Addendum D, pgs 8-9. In addition, the State argued that the drugs found in the 
closet were lawfully seized in that they were in "plain view". See, Addendum D, pg 9. The 
trial court ruled that the gun and the paraphernalia were admissible evidence seized incident 
to an arrest. See, Addendum D, pg 10. The trial court found that the drugs found in the 
tin container in the closet were seized lawfully as incriminating evidence in "plain view". Id. 
The trial was held on December 18, 1995. At trial Deputy Zwemke, who found the 
drugs in the tin container testified to facts that unfortunately were not developed further at 
the preliminary hearing. Specifically, the Deputy testified that he found the tin container 
on top of shelf in the closet which due to its height Deputy Zwemke could not see directly 
into the container without picking it off the shelf. See, Addendum E, pg 95. The Deputy 
testified that after he took the container off the shelf he then could see into where he 
observed what appeared to be "little baggies" that the Deputy believed to contain 
contraband. Id. Neither defense counsel nor the trial court raised the issue of admissibility 
of the evidence found in the tin container after Zwemke's testimony. The jury found Mr. 
Gallegos guilty of both counts of Possession of a Controlled Substance and one count 
Possession of Paraphrenia. The jury acquitted Mr. Gallegos of the Possession of a 
Dangerous Weapon by Convicted Person. 
The trial court sentenced Mr. Gallegos to serve two indeterminate terms of zero to 
five years in the Utah State Prison and six months in the Weber County Jail, all terms to 
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run concurrently with each other and consecutively to any previous sentence imposed. 
David Gallegos, through his original Appellant counsel instituted this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE RELEVANT FACTS 
On June 29, 1995, with a bench warrant for the arrest of David Gallegos, Deputies 
Hartley and Zwemke, entered the apartment of Corrinna Passillas to search for Mr. 
Gallegos. They found him hiding in a hole cut into the floor. As he was exiting the hole, 
Deputies Hartley and Zwemke, noticed the Appellant reach towards the area between the 
box spring and the mattress of the bed. Gallegos was handcuffed and taken out of the 
room. In the search of Mr. Gallegos' person Deputy Zwemke found an empty syringe in 
Gallegos' pocket. Deputy Hartley found a .22 caliber pistol between the box spring and the 
mattress. Deputy Zwemke re-entered the room after securing Mr. Gallegos outside the 
room and found a tin container on the top shelf in a closet. In the container were five small 
plastic baggies containing substances that were later tested to be had to cocaine and 
methamphetamine, and a copy of David Gallegos' birth certificate. 
At the preliminary hearing, Deputy Zwemke testified that he looked in the tin 
container because "there was no lid on it." See, Addendum A, pg 17. At trial, Appellant's 
trial counsel developed Deputy Zwemke's testimony further about how he came upon the 
tin container in the closet. At trial Zwemke testified that "...just picked it up like this" and 
"then looked into it." See, Addendum E, pgs 95-96. When counsel asked him if he "actually 
had to pick it up before you could look inside of it? Zwemke responded, "well, yeah. It was 
kind of up on a shelf. I couldn't - wasn't tall enough to see up on top there." Id at 96. 
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Neither trial counsel nor the trial court addressed the admissibility of the methamphetamine 
or the cocaine after the Deputy concluded his testimony. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in denying trial counsel's Motion to Suppress since the area on 
or about the threshold of the closet in which the defendant was standing was not "within the 
defendant's reach and the presence of the Deputy Zwemke in that area was not lawful, thus 
negating a finding of "plain view". 
The trial court erred in not adopting trial counsel's interpretation of §77-7-9 which 
would necessitate the trial court holding that the contraband found in the closet was 
unlawfully seized. In the alternative, if this Court does not find persuasive the 
forementioned arguments, Appellant would contend that the trial court correctly ruled that 
the evidence found in the closet was within the "plain view" exception given the limited 
evidence before the trial court at that time. 
Upon a finding that the trial court ruled correctly, Appellant would argue that the 
trial court committed plain error when it did not sua sponte rule that the evidence of 
methamphetamine and cocaine was inadmissible upon the testimony elicited from Deputy 
Zwemke clearly showing that the evidence was not in "plain view". Appellant's trial counsel 
was ineffective, in that, he should have re-asserted or moved at trial to have the evidence 
of methamphetamine and cocaine declared inadmissible. Clearly, had trial counsel moved 
to have that evidence declared inadmissible he would have received a more favorable 
outcome at trial. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING TRIAL COUNSELS MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS SINCE THE AREA AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 
CLOSET WAS NOT WITHIN THE DEFENDANTS REACH AND THUS 
THE PRESENCE OF DEPUTY ZWEMKE IN THAT AREA WAS NOT 
LAWFUL NEGATING ANY FINDING OF "PLAIN VIEW" 
This Court will review the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision to 
deny or grant a motion to suppress under the clearly erroneous standard. State v. Brown, 
853 P.2d 851, 854 (Utah 1992). This court will find that clear error exists only if the factual 
findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported by the record. State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). However, this Court reviews the trial court's conclusions 
of law based on such facts under a correctness standard, according no deference to the trial 
court's legal conclusions. Pena, 869 P.2d at 936; accord State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 
(Utah 1993); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991). 
Trial counsel advocated one main argument in his Motion to Suppress, mainly that 
under §77-7-9 that neither the weapon or the drugs found in the closet were lawfully seized. 
The trial court elucidated its interpretation of §77-7-9 by stating that "about his person 
means the area that is within the defendant's reach at the time of arrest, not the search. 
And that it may be search incident to an arrest to ascertain the existence of a weapon. 
Therefore, the court denies the motion to suppress the finding of the weapon." See, 
Addendum D, pg 10. The clear import of the trial court's conclusion is that it implicitly 
found that Mr. Gallegos was arrested on or near the mattress and box spring and that area 
was "within the defendant's reach at the time of arrest" such that the search of that portion 
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of the bed was lawful. 
Even though the State argued that the drugs found in the closet would be admissible 
under a search incident to an arrest the trial court declined to rule that way. See, 
Addendum C, pg 8. Instead the trial court found after listening to argument and the 
prelimnary hearing tape that the drugs were found in "plain view". See, Addendum D, pg 
10. Once again, the trial court's decision implies that the drugs were not "within the 
defendant's reach at the time of arrest." 
If the closet was not "within the defendant's reach" than the officer's presence near 
or at the threshold of the closet was not lawful. This follows from the fact that the only 
area in which the deputy may search, and therefore be present in, is the area "within the 
defendant's reach". If the deputy's presence is not lawful then the contraband which is in 
"plain view" from that unlawful vantage point is inadmissible. The State to successfully 
assert the a "plain view" exception must show that there was a "(1) lawful presence of the 
officer; (2) evidence in plain view; and (3) evidence which is clearly incriminating." State v. 
Homes, 774 P.2d 506, 510 (Utah App. 1989). The State cannot establish nor can the trial 
court find that Deputy Zwemke was lawfully present when he saw the tin container in the 
closet, thus obviating any finding of "plain view". The trial court's ruling to deny trial 
counsel's Motion to Suppress was in error. 
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POINT II 
TRIAL COUNSEL ADVOCATED A MORE RESTRICTIVE 
INTERPRETATION OF THE LANGUAGE OF "ON OR ABOUT HIS 
PERSON" AS FOUND IN §77-7-9 AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
NOT ADOPTING SUCH INTERPRETATION 
At the suppression hearing, trial counsel specifically argued that the Utah 
Constitution and §77-7-9 is more restrictive in the area to be search such that the evidence 
of drugs found in the closet would be inadmissible. See, Addendum D, pgs 2-8. The State 
responded to trial counsel's averments and advanced an alternative exception that of "plain 
view". See, Addendum D, pg 9. Trial counsel's proposed interpretation would so limit the 
area to search under §77-7-9 that Deputy Zwemke would only be able to search the hole 
in which Mr. Gallegos was found and probably an area within 10 inches of that hole. 
Appellant is asking this Court to adopt such a restrictive interpretation of Utah Code Ann. 
§77-7-9 (1953, as amended) as to make any evidence found in the closet inadmissible under 
the search incident to an arrest as well as the alternative theory of "plain view" for the 
reasons cited earlier: namely, that the State cannot show that Deputy Zwemke was lawfully 
in the area of the closet when he noticed the contraband. 
Unfortunately, Utah Code Ann. §77-7-9 has not been interpreted by any courts in this 
State nor is there a reported case citing the aforementioned provision. It appears in the 
development of the area that can be lawfully searched incident to an arrest, the courts of 
this State have consistently looked to federal case law for guidance. Chimel v. California, 
395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) and its progeny are routinely cited by the state courts. 
§77-7-9 and its predecessors, for example §4647 of the Revised Statutes of Utah 
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(1898), which was adopted after statehood, contained similar wording in that "[A]ny person 
making an arrest may take from the person arrested all offensive weapons which he may 
have about his person..." See, Addendum B, pg 6. There appears to a long history in which 
the Legislature has routinely limited the search for weapons to those found on or "about his 
person." §77-7-9 and its predecessors has never been repealed and it has continued to 
exist even as the federal law, with Chimel seemed to expand the area which was allowed 
to be searched incident to an arrest. Moreover, Chimel speaks of "area of immediate 
control", Id at 764, which has been defined as the area from which arrestee might gain 
possession of a weapon, whereas, §77-7-9 talks of "on or about his person.". The legislature 
has historically declined to mimic the Chimel language even with successive amendments 
to the Criminal code. This conscious disregard for federal precedent would appear to 
militate in favor of a more restricted intrepretation of the area to be searched than would 
otherwise be allowed under Chimel. 
Unfortunately, this Court nor the Supreme Court has defined the exact area to be 
searched when an arrest has been made under §77-7-9. Texas has also used "on or about" 
and in Freeman v. State, 864 S.W. 2d 757 (Texas App. Houston [1st Dist] 1993), that court 
defined "on or about his person" to mean "nearby, close at hand, convenient of access, and 
within such distance of the party so having it as that such party could, without materially 
changing his position, get his hands on it." 
Appellant asks this Court to interpret §77-7-9 as limiting the search of weapons and 
or contraband found to the area which is nearby, close at hand, convenient of access, and 
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within such distance of the party so having it as that such party could, without materially 
changing his position, get his hands on it. Upon adopting such interpretation this Court 
can see that even under a liberal interpretation of the facts in favor of Appellee as found 
at the preliminary hearing or at trial that the evidence found in the closet was inadmissible. 
POINT III 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE TRIAL COURT, AT THE TIME OF THE 
SUPPRESSION HEARING, CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE DRUGS 
FOUND IN THE CLOSET WERE ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE PLAIN 
VIEW" EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT. 
This Court will review the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision under 
the clearly erroneous standard. State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 854 (Utah 1992). This court 
will find that clear error exists only if the factual findings made by the trial court are not 
adequately supported by the record. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). 
However, this Court reviews the trial court's conclusions of law based on such facts under 
a correctness standard, according no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Pena, 
869 P.2d at 936; accord State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993); State v. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991). 
Alternatively, if this Court does not find Appellant's arguments in both POINTS I 
& II persuasive, Appellant asks that this Court uphold the denial of the suppression of the 
drugs on the "plain view" exception. The trial court in deciding trial counsel's Motion to 
Suppress did not have the benefit of live testimony and instead was constrained by the non-
dynamic quality of the preliminary hearing tape. The trial court after hearing from the both 
the State and Mr. Gallegos' trial counsel concluded that the gun found between the mattress 
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and box spring was admissible as evidence obtained from a search incident to an arrest. 
See, Addendum D, pg 10. The trial court declined to find that the drugs located in the tin 
container in the closet were also admissible as evidence obtained from an search incident 
to an arrest. The trial court without more than just its conclusion stated that the 
methamphetamine and cocaine were lawfully seized under the "plain view" exception to the 
warrant requirement. Id. 
1. Plain view. 
Appellee in his response brief argues that the trial court correctly ruled at the time 
of the suppression hearing that, given the evidence available, the drugs in question were 
found in "plain view". This Court should find that the trial court correctly ruled with the 
limited information before it that the evidence of drugs were found in "plain view". 
2. Search incident to arrest. 
Appellee has argued alternatively that even if the evidence was not in "plain view" 
the district court's decision to deny the Motion to Suppress is entitled to affirmation on the 
ground that the seizure of the evidence in the tin container was lawful seizure incident to 
arrest. Upon review of the preliminary hearing transcript in which the district court based 
its decision to deny Appellant's Motion to Suppress, it is quite apparent that there was little 
evidence adduced as to the location of the closet, the distance of the closet from the 
Appellant at the time of arrest, the distance of the drugs from the Appellant and whether 
they were "on or about his person" as required by Utah Code Ann.§77-7-9 (1953, as 
amended) or "within the defendant's reach" as interpreted by the trial court. See, 
Addenddum A. Moreover, the record is silent as to whether the district court may have 
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entertained this argument at the suppression hearing but rejected it for lack of evidence and 
in turn relied upon the "plain view" exception to deny Appellant's Motion to Suppress. 
What is clear, is that for this Court to find that the evidence seized from the closet 
was from a lawful search incident to an arrest, this Court will have to assume facts that are 
not in the record. Appellee relies exclusively on that the fact that the drugs where found 
in the room where Mr. Gallegos was arrested. This fact alone cannot sustain that the search 
of the closet was lawful under the search incident to arrest exception. Appellee cites State 
v. Webb. 790 P. 2d 65 (Utah App. 1990) for the proposition that a search of an arrestee's 
bedroom was proper under the search incident to an arrest exception. However, that is a 
misstatement of the case. In Webb, the State had argued that a shotgun was found in "plain 
view" while the officer's were there to arrest Webb. In fact that court found that "[TJhere 
is simply no evidence that, with Webb in handcuffs, all the arresting officers left the room 
totally unaware of the shotgun and then returned to that room later and discovered the 
shotgun in plain view for the first time. From the testimony presented, it appears that the 
shotgun was located while the officers were lawfully present in the room to arrest Webb." 
In fact, the Webb court noted, in footnote number 6 of its opinion that "Webb does not 
dispute the presence of the last two elements of the plain view doctrine. Instead, he asserts 
only that the re-entry of the police into his bedroom once he had been removed from it was 
unlawful." 
Appellee also cites State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769 (Utah App.1991). In that case, 
the reviewing court found that a search of a diaper bag some ten feet from where the 
suspects were arrested was a valid search incident to an arrest. The Harrison court however 
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was not truly confident of this determination when it stated that "even if the searches 
leading to police recovery of the pistol were improper, under these circumstances there was 
no reasonable likelihood of a different trial outcome had the gun been suppressed." Clearly, 
the Harrison court was not sure of its decision to extend the search of a diaper bag found 
ten feet from the suspects under the rubric of a search incident to an arrest. Appellee can 
cite no evidence in the record that the closet in this case was ten feet or less from Mr. 
Gallegos when he was arrested. In finding Harrison persuasive, this Court would have to 
assume that the closet was less than or at the very least ten feet from the Appellant at the 
time of arrest, which absent a clear record this Court is without authority to do. Moreover, 
for the reasons stated earlier the comments of the Harrison court call into question whether 
their decision to extend the area that may be lawfully searched is good law. 
POINT IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED "PLAIN ERROR" IN NOT SUA 
SPONTE FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE FOUND IN THE CLOSET WAS 
INADMISSIBLE. 
It is a well-established rule that a defendant who fails to bring an issue before the 
trial court is generally barred from raising it for the first time on appeal. State v. Lopez, 
886 P.2d 1105,1113 (Utah 1994). An appellate court may address an issue for the first time 
on appeal if appellant establishes that the trial court committed "plain error," State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993); Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 922. In order to obtain 
appellate relief through the doctrine of "plain error," an appellant must establish that "(i) 
[a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the 
error is harmful." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. If appellant fails to prove one of these 
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requirements, plain error is not established. Id. at 1209. 
1. The trial court in allowing evidence of the methamphetamine and cocaine to be 
submitted to the jury in light of the evidence which was uncontroverted that the drugs found in 
the closet were not discovered in "plain view". 
The trial court had ruled at the Motion to Suppress hearing held on October 19,1995 
that the evidence of the drugs found in the tin container on the shelf in the closet was 
admissible under the "plain view" exception to the warrant requirement. See, Addendum 
D, pg 10. At the preliminary hearing Zwemke's testified on direct examination that "while 
searching for any other kind of weapons, I found a small purple tin container in the closet 
which had assorted paraphernalia items and also five small plastic baggies with a white 
powdery salmon colored substance. There was also within the tin, there was a copy of a birth 
certificate which was David GallegosV See, Addendum A, pg 14-15. Trial counsel during 
cross-examination of Zwemke asked "Why did you look inside of there", referring to the tin 
container. Id at 17. Deputy Zwemke answered "There was no lid on it." Id. Without the 
benefit of explicit Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it may only be surmised that the 
trial court found that because the lid was off of the tin container that the drugs were "plain 
view". The trial court should have been familiar with its earlier evidentiary rulings 
on the admissibility of the drugs when it began to listen to the testimony of Deputy Zwemke 
at trial. Appellant's trial counsel asked Zwemke on cross-examination that "you actually had 
to pick it up before you could look inside of it?" To which Zwemke responded "Well, yeah. 
It was kind of up on a shelf. I couldn't - wasn't tall enough to see up on top there." See, 
Addendum E, pg 96. Upon hearing this extraordinary revelation as to the sequence of 
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events that led up to the discovery of the drugs in closet the trial court should have realized 
that this testimony completely eliminated any finding of "plain view". 
2. The error was obvious to the trial court. 
Briefly, the "plain view" exception to the warrant requirement requires that "(1) 
lawful presence of the officer; (2) evidence in plain view; and (3) evidence which is clearly 
incriminating." State v. Homes, 774 P.2d 506, 510 (Utah App. 1989). The trial testimony 
of Zwemke militates against a factual finding that the evidence was "in plain view" when he 
found it. Without the presence of all three factors the evidence found in the closet was 
inadmissible at trial. The trial court should have sua sponte found that in light of the 
testimony of Deputy Zwemke that the evidence of drugs was inadmissible against the 
Appellant. The trial court should have been aware of its earlier finding at the suppression 
hearing and upon hearing the testimony of Zwemke it should have realized that the 
testimony negated a finding of "plain view". 
3. The error was harmful. 
It is irrefutable. Had the court, in realizing its earlier mistake regarding the 
admissibility of the drugs in the closet, ruled that they were no longer admissible the result 
would have been more favorable to the Appellant. Without the drugs and their discovery 
next to Appellant's birth certificate, the State would have had to dismiss the two counts of 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, third degree felonies. This Court should find that the 
trial court in failing to suppress the evidence committed plain error. This Court should now 
invoke its Appellate Court powers and suppress evidence of the drugs in the closet. 
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POINT V 
TRIAL COUNSEL ACTED SO DEFICIENTLY, IN FAILING TO RE-
ASSERT OR MOVE FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE OF 
METHAMPHETAMINE AND COCAINE FOUND IN THE CLOSET AFTER 
THE TESTIMONY OF DEPUTY ZWEMKE, THAT IT DENIED THE 
APPELLANT HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
The United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution guarantee criminal defendant's 
the right to effective assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. Amend. VI; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, 
Section 1; Utah Const. Art. 1, Section 7; Utah Const. Art, Section 12; See also, Strickland v. 
Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984); State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 
(1990). In successfully asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Appellant must 
show that (1) his counsel's performance was objectively deficient, and (2) that there exists a 
reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's deficient conduct, the verdict would have been 
more favorable to the defendant. State v. Cummin, 839 P.2d 848 (Utah App. 1992). 
On appeal, Appellant advances the argument that trial counsel was deficient for not re-
asserting his Motion to Suppress evidence of contraband found in the tin container located in the 
closet upon hearing testimony negating the trial court's earlier ruling finding such evidence in 
"plain view". The decision not to re-assert or move for suppression at trial cannot be said to 
be within those "legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal." Temglin, 805 
P.2d at 186 (quoting Strickland,466 U.S. at 689). Trial counsel's specific failure or omission 
in this case would clearly fall outside the range of accepted "trial strategy". It is clear that 
under Cummins trial counsel's performance was objectively deficient. 
To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant must establish that 
there was prejudice or a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome. This conclusion 
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is, without question, axiomatic. Had trial counsel move to suppress evidence of the drugs 
found in the closet by arguing that the testimony elicited from Deputy Zwemke establishes 
unequivocally that the drugs were not "plain view", the trial court would have had to suppress 
the evidence. The next logical consequence of said suppression would have been trial counsel's 
motion to dismiss the two counts of Possession of a Controlled Substance and the inexorable 
granting of said motion by the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
The logical conclusion that follows from the finding that the closet was not "within the 
defendant's reach" was that area was off limits to any search. However, Deputy Zwemke had 
to be at the very least at the threshold of the closet area to see the tin container. Zwemke was 
unlawfully in that area. The trial court further concluded that the drugs were in "plain view" 
is erroneous in that the unlawful presence of the officer negates such a finding. This Court must 
find that evidence of the cocaine and methamphetamine was inadmissible and reverse and 
remand for further trial proceedings. 
This Court should adopt the language found in Freeman v. State, 864 S.W. 2d 757 
(Texas App. Houston [1st Dist] 1993). That court defined "on or about his person" as it was 
found in the Texas concealed weapon statute to mean "nearby, close at hand, convenient 
of access, and within such distance of the party so having it as that such party could, without 
materially changing his position, get his hand on it." Appellant asks that the Freeman 
definition be adopted as defining "on or about his person" in §77-7-9. Upon such adoption 
this Court should find that the evidence of Methamphetamine and Cocaine found in the tin 
container located in the closet should be suppressed. 
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Alternatively, if this Court finds neither Points I & II persuasive, this Court should 
still uphold the trial court's decision on "plain view" in light of the very limited evidence 
before it at the time of the Suppression Hearing. Finally, either the trial court committed 
plain error when it did not sua sponte find the aforementioned evidence inadmissible or trial 
counsel was objectively deficient in not moving for said suppression and such omission 
clearly prejudiced the outcome of Mr. Gallegos case. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
It is requested that oral argument be granted to assist this Court in defining the issues and 
understanding the determinative law. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of January, 1998. 
MICHAEL L BOYLE *^f 
Attorney for Appelant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed/delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant, this 22nd day of January, 1998, to Norman E. Plate, Assistant Attorney General, 
Criminal Appeals Division, 160 East 300 South, 6th floor, P.O. Box 140856, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114-0856. /? 
) 
MICHAEL J/ B< 
Attorney for Appellam 
21 
ADDENDUM "A" 
Preliminary Hearing 
August 15, 1995 
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Q DID YOU TAKE CUSTODY OF HIM --
A YES, I DID. 
Q --AT THAT POINT IN TIME? WHAT DID YOU DO WITH HIM AFTER 
THAT? 
A I PATTED DOWN MR. GALLEGOS. DID YOU -- TELL ME WHAT I 
FOUND IN HIS POCKETS? 
Q YES. 
A OKAY. I DID A QUICK PAT DOWN FOR ANY OTHER KIND OF 
WEAPONS OR ANYTHING THAT WOULD HARM THE DEPUTIES. AND I FOUND 
A -- IN MR. GALLEGOS' LEFT FRONT POCKET, I FOUND AN EMPTY 
SYRINGE AND ALSO FOUND EIGHT DOLLARS IN MR. GALLEGOS" RIGHT 
POCKET. AT THAT TIME AFTER I HANDCUFFED HIM, I TOOK HIM OUT 
INTO THE FRONT LIVING ROOM OF THE APARTMENT. 
Q OKAY. AT SOME POINT IN TIME DID YOU HELP TO SEARCH THE 
BEDROOM WHERE --
A YES --
Q --MR. GALLEGOS WAS --
A --AT THAT TIME I -- THERE WAS A GUN THAT WAS FOUND IN 
THE BEDROOM AND I WENT BACK IN TO ASSIST TO LOCATE ANY OTHER 
WEAPONS THAT MIGHT BE CONCEALED WITHIN THE APARTMENT IN THE 
BEDROOM AREA. 
Q WHAT IF ANYTHING DID YOU FIND? 
A WHILE SEARCHING FOR ANY OTHER KIND OF WEAPONS, I FOUND A 
SMALL PURPLE METAL TIN CONTAINER IN THE CLOSET WHICH HAD 
ASSORTED PARAPHERNALIA ITEMS AND ALSO FIVE SMALL PLASTIC 
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BAGGIES WITH A WHITE POWDERY SALMON COLORED SUBSTANCE. THERE 
WAS ALSO WITHIN THE TIN, THERE WAS A COPY OF A BIRTH 
CERTIFICATE WHICH WAS DAVID GALLEGOS'. 
Q THAT BIRTH CERTIFICATE BELONG TO DAVE? 
A YES, IT DID. 
Q WHO ELSE WAS IN THE APARTMENT WITH YOU? 
A CORINNA WAS IN THERE AND CORINNA -- I CAN'T -- PRECILLA, 
I BELIEVE IS HER LAST NAME. I DON'T KNOW IF I'M SAYING THAT 
RIGHT. WAS IN THE APARTMENT AT THE TIME THAT WE WERE 
SEARCHING. AND WHEN I DID FIND THE METAL TIN, I ASKED WHOSE 
TIN WAS THIS, AND SHE SAID IT WAS DAVID GALLEGOS' TIN. 
MR. GRAVIS: YOUR HONOR, WE'RE GONNA OBJECT TO THAT. 
IT'S HEARSAY. SHE'S PRESENT, CAN TESTIFY. 
THE COURT: MR. SAUNDERS, ANY RESPONSE? 
MR. SAUNDERS: NO, YOUR HONOR. WE'RE PREPARED OFF 
(UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
THE COURT: I'LL STRIKE IT AT THIS POINT. 
|BY MR. SAUNDERS: 
Q DID THIS ALL TAKE PLACE IN WEBER COUNTY? 
A YES, IT DID. 
Q CAN YOU IDENTIFY PERSON YOU KNOW TO BE DAVID GALLEGOS? 
A YES. HE'S THE DEFENDANT SITTING RIGHT HERE IN THE WHITE 
JUMP SUIT. 
Q DID YOU TAKE CUSTODY OF THE BOX WITH THE SUBSTANCES IN 
IT? 
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A YES, I DID. 
Q WHAT DID YOU DO WITH THAT? 
A I TOOK THOSE TO OUR OFFICE AND PLACED THOSE INTO 
EVIDENCE. 
MR. SAUNDERS: YOUR HONOR, WE'RE MOVING TO ADMIT INTO 
EVIDENCE A LAB REPORT FROM THE CRIME LAB SHOWING THAT COCAINE 
RESIDUE WAS FOUND IN THE METAL TUBE. COCAINE RESIDUE WAS 
IDENTIFIED THROUGH THE FIVE PLASTIC BAGS AND METHAMPHETAMINE 
RESIDUE WAS IDENTIFIED IN TWO OF THE FIVE PLASTIC BAGS. 
MR. GRAVIS: STIPULATE TO THAT FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
PRELIMINARY HEARING ONLY. 
THE COURT: COURT WILL RECEIVE THAT STIPULATION. 
MR. SAUNDERS: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
IBY MR. GRAVIS: 
Q HOW BIG'S THIS PURPLE TIN? 
A IT WAS A -- I BELIEVE IT HAD LIKE A CAMEL -- THE CAMEL 
CIGARETTE CAMEL ON IT, SO IT WAS JUST A SMALL, I BELIEVE OR --
Q THE SIZE OF A PACKAGE OF CIGARETTES? 
A OH, NO. LARGER THAN THAT. 
Q HOW MUCH LARGER? 
A CONSIDERABLY. PROBABLY JUST A ROUGH ESTIMATE, I'D SAY 
MAYBE THREE INCHES IN DIAMETER BY MAYBE FOUR INCHES. THREE BY 
FOUR, MAYBE THREE BY FIVE, SOMETHING LIKE THAT. JUST A SMALL 
METAL TIN ABOUT LIKE THIS. 
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Q HOW DEEP? 
A OH, ABOUT MAYBE TWO INCHES DEEP. 
Q WHERE IS THAT AT NOW? 
A IT'S IN OUR EVIDENCE LOCKER. 
Q WHY DID YOU LOOK INSIDE OF THERE? 
A THERE WAS NO LID ON IT. 
Q THERE WAS NO LID ON IT? 
A NO. 
Q OKAY. 
A I WAS JUST MAKING SURE THERE WASN'T ANY GUNS OR ANYTHING. 
Q WHERE WAS MR. GALLEGOS AT AT THIS TIME? 
A HE WAS HANDCUFFED AND WAS IN THE FRONT ROOM AT THAT TIME. 
Q OKAY. AND AT THE TIME THAT DEPUTY HARTLEY FOUND THE 
WEAPON BETWEEN THE MATTRESSES, WHERE WAS DAVID AT? 
A I BELIEVE HE WAS IN THE FRONT ROOM AT THAT TIME. 
Q OKAY. WHO WAS THE O.P.D. OFFICER THAT WAS WITH YOU? 
A THERE WAS SEVERAL O.P.D. OFFICERS THERE. 
Q WHAT ARE THEIR NAMES? 
A THE ONLY ONE I CAN REMEMBER WAS -- I BELIEVE GARY 
PETERSON WAS THERE. AND I'M NOT SURE WHO THE OTHER ONE WAS. 
THEY PRETTY WELL STAYED OUT IN THE FRONT ROOM AREA. THEY 
DIDN'T REALLY COME INTO THE BACK BEDROOM. THEY WERE THERE 
BASICALLY TO KEEP AN EYE ON OUR SUBJECT WHILE WE WERE DOING 
THE --
Q AND THERE WAS CORINNA AND THERE WAS ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL 
ADDENDUM "B" 
Amended Motion 
to Suppress 
MARTIN V. GRAVIS (1237) 
Attorney for Defendant 
2568 Washington Blvd., Suite 203 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 392-8247 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Plaintiff, 
vs. : 
DAVID GALLEGOS, : Case No. 
Defendant. : Judge MICHAEL D. LYON 
COMES NOW, Martin V. Gravis, Attorney for Defendant David 
Gallegos, and hereby submits the following Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
FACTS 
The Defendant was located in a small hole in the floor of the 
rear bedroom of an apartment at 2341 Madison Ave., Ogden, Utah. As 
he was climbing out, he moved his hand toward a mattress and box 
springs located approximately 10" from his position. Deputy Zwemke 
handcuffed the Defendant and did a quick pat down on him. He found 
an empty syringe in the Defendant's left front pocket, and eight 
dollars in the Defendant's right front pocket. 
The Defendant was taken into the front living room. Deputy 
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Hartley searched the bedroom and located a 22 cal. serai-automatic 
pistol underneath the mattress. Deputy Zwemke went into the 
bedroom to assist Deputy Hartley, and while searching located a tin 
container in a closet which contained assorted paraphernalia, five 
small plastic baggies with white/salmon colored residue, which 
contained methamphetamine and cocaine, and copy of a birth 
certificate. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The State lacked legal authority to search the room where 
Defendant was arrested. 
Utah Code Ann. Title 77-7-9 provides that MAny person making 
an arrest may seize from the person arrested all weapons which he 
may have on or about his person". This statute has never been 
interpreted by the Appellate Courts of Utah. 
Existing law concerning search incident to arrest follows the 
federal law in that said case allows for the search and seizure of 
weapons in the immediate presence of the arrested person. See 
State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d 769 (Utah App. 1991) where a search of 
a diaper bag was allowed even though the Defendant and his wife 
were ten feet away and had been ordered to the ground and searched 
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by police. 
While no definition of what "on or about his person" exists 
pursuant to Utah law, the Court of Appeals of Texas in Freeman v. 
State, 864 S.W.2d 757 (Texas App.-Houston [1st Dist] 1993) held 
that "on or about his person", in dealing with a concealed weapon 
statute, meant "nearby, close at hand, convenient of access, and 
within such distance of the party so having it as that such party 
could, without materially changing his position, get his hand on 
it." 
The Florida Appeals Court in Arnesman v. State, 540 So-2d 219 
(Fla. App. 2 Dist. 1989) similarly held that, "the term 'on or 
about the person7 means physically on the person or readily 
accessible to him." Quoting Ensor v. State, 403 So.2d 349 (Fla. 
1981) . 
The Utah Supreme Court in defining the term carrying a 
concealed weapon has also held that "where the weapon is shown to 
be under Defendant's control and within his immediate, easy or 
ready access, he will be deemed to be 'carrying' the weapon." 
State v. Williams, 636 P.2d 1092 (1981). 
In that case, the Supreme Court cited the case of Brown v. 
United States. 30 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1929) which held that a 
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weapon was concealed about a person when it is "concealed near, in 
close proximity to him, and within his convenient control and easy 
reach, so that he could promptly use it, if prompted to do so by 
any violent motive." 
In this case, the Defendant was arrested while hiding in the 
floor of the bedroom of his girlfriend's apartment. Both officers 
at the preliminary hearing testified that as the Defendant was 
exiting the floor, he attempted to reach under the mattress of the 
bed, but was stopped, handcuffed and taken from the room. After he 
was taken from the room, or in the process of being taken from the 
room but a distance away, Deputy Hartley searched under the 
mattress and found the gun. And after he was in another room, 
Deputy Zwemke returned to the bedroom and searched a closet and 
found the methamphetamine and cocaine, and there is no evidence as 
to the distance from where the Defendant was arrested to the 
closet. 
POINT II 
THE FACT THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS OUT OF THE ROOM, OR WAS BEING 
MOVED FROM THE ROOM, MAKES THE SEARCH ILLEGAL. 
When the Defendant was handcuffed and removed from his place 
of arrest, any search must be made pursuant to a warrant. In State 
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v, Hyahf 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), in a concurring opinion, Justice 
Zimmerman stated, "Once the threat that the suspect will injure the 
officers with concealed weapons or will destroy evidence is gone, 
there is no persuasive reason why the officers cannot take the time 
to secure a warrant. Such a requirement would present little 
impediment to police investigations, especially in light of the 
ease with which warrants can be obtained under Utah's telephonic 
warrant statute, U.C.A., 1953, § 7-23-4(2) (1982 ed.) n , which was 
cited with approval in State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990). 
POINT III 
ARTICLE I SECTION 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
REQUIRES THAT SEARCHES INCIDENT TO ARREST BE RESTRICTED TO THE 
SEIZURE OF WEAPONS ON OR ABOUT THE PERSON ARRESTED. 
In State v. Larocco, infra., the Supreme Court held that the 
interpretation of Article I Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah 
does not have to follow the Federal Court's rulings on the 4th 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
The Utah legislature has restricted the seizure of weapons 
upon arrest by Utah Code Ann. Title 77-7-9 and it's predecessors. 
See Revised Statutes of Utah 1898 4647, "Any person making an 
arrest may take from the person arrested all offensive weapons 
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which he may have about his person..," 
Therefore, it appears that since statehood, the legislature 
has felt compelled by Article I Section 14 to limit seizures of 
weapons at time of arrest to those weapons "on or about" the 
arrested person. 
Search incident to arrest is a judicially created exception to 
the warrant requirement of Article I Section 14 of the Constitution 
of Utah which requires that all searches be made pursuant to 
warrant, and therefore the legislature, in passing Title 77-7-9, 
has limited the warrantless search exception, for searches incident 
to arrest, of the Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
The search and seizure of the firearm were made in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. Title 77-7-9 and Article I Section 14 of the 
Constitution of Utah and therefore were illegally obtained and 
should be suppressed. 
DATED this ' day of August, 1995. 
MARTIN V, GRAVIS' 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing, Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress, by hand, th] day of August, 1995, to: 
Weber County Attorney's Office 
2549 Washington Blvd., 7th Floor 
Ogden, Utah 844 01 
CMC 4145 A cw^o 
SECRETARY 
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ADDENDUM "C" 
Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion 
to Suppress 
POINT II. 
The search for the gun was a valid search incident to arrest. 
When officers entered the apartment of Corinna Passillas, they 
found the Defendant hiding underneath the carpeting of the bedroom, 
in a hole that had been cut out of the flooring. As the Defendant 
was ordered out of the hole, he moved his hand toward, and 
according to Deputy Hartley, reached his hand in between two 
mattresses, in what officers believed was an attempt to reach a 
weapon. The Defendant was ordered to hold up his hands. After 
some hesitance, the Defendant finally complied. The Defendant was 
hand-cuffed and Deputy Zwemke patted the Defendant down and found 
an empty syringe in his front pocket. Deputy Zwemke took custody 
of the Defendant and took him out of the bedroom into the living-
room. As the Defendant was taken out of the room, Deputy Hartley 
searched the mattress where the Defendant had been reaching and 
found a fully loaded Jennings .22 caliber semi-automatic pistol. 
Deputy Hartley testified at the preliminary hearing that the search 
took place "real close in time" to the time Defendant was taken out 
of the bedroom. He believed that he searched as Defendant was 
being taken out of the bedroom, but stated that Defendant could 
have been out of the bedroom at the time of the search. 
Defendant argues that since the officers took the extra 
precaution of hand-cuffing him and removing him from the area where 
they believed he had a weapon, that they could no longer search 
that area incident to arrest. 
One of the landmark cases in this area is the United States 
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Supreme Court case of Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 33 (1970), 
where the Court stated that fI[l]ast Term in Chimel v. Californiaf 
395 U.S. 752,..we held that when the search of a dwelling is sought 
to be justified as incident to a lawful arrest, it must 
constitutionally be confined to the area within the arrestee's 
reach at the time of his arrest-7the area from which he might gain 
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.7" Chimel at 763 
(Emphasis added). 
Therefore, the area that can be searched incident to arrest is 
the area that was within the Defendants reach at the time of 
arrest, not the time of the search. In this case, the mattress 
where the gun was found, and the place that the drugs were found 
were within the Defendant's reach at the time he was arrested. The 
fact that he was moved from that place before the search, for the 
officers protection, should not make the search illegal. 
I could not find any Utah cases that specifically deal with 
this issue. However, I did find a case from another jurisdiction 
which is very similar to this case. In the case of U.S. v. Turner, 
926 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1991), police had a warrant of arrest for a 
suspect and entered an apartment where defendant was staying. As 
they entered the apartment, police found their suspect in bed with 
a woman. Beside the suspect, beneath the sheet of the bed, police 
found a revolver. The officers hand-cuffed the suspect and took 
him into another room. They then searched the bedroom where the 
suspect was at the time of his arrest. On appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit held that the search was a valid search incident to arrest 
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even though the suspect had been removed from the area. The court 
used a two-step test. The first question they asked was "whether 
the searched bag was within the arrestee's immediate control when 
he was arrested." Id. at 887 (Emphasis in original). The court 
found that it was. Then second question was "whether subsequent 
events made the search unreasonable." Id. at 888. The Court held 
that "[t]he officers hand-cuffed Turner and took him into the next 
room out of concern for safety. We cannot say that these concerns 
were unfounded, for they already discovered a concealed weapon 
beneath the bedding. They did not take him far away or delay for 
long before conducting the search. Under the circumstances, we 
cannot find the search that revealed the baggies of cocaine 
inconsistent with Chimel or Andersonn." Id. 
Using this same test in this case, it is clear that the search 
of the bedroom in this case was a valid search incident to arrest. 
The Defendant is a person who had previously evaded two of these 
officers a few days before, and was a person the officers believed 
would do anything to get away. The defendant was hiding under the 
flooring. When he was ordered out of the flooring, he reached 
toward the mattress, in what the officers believed was an attempt 
to get a weapon. Defendant was ordered to remove his hands and he 
hesitated and did not respond for a few moments. The Defendant was 
searched and an empty syringe was found in his pocket. The places 
that were searched were in Defendant's immediate control at the 
time of his arrest. 
In this case the officers had valid concerns for their safety. 
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Defendant had evaded them before. They felt he would do anything 
to escape. They felt that he was reaching for a weapon. They did 
not take him far away or delay in making the search. Therefore, the 
search should be viewed as reasonable under the circumstances. 
The search incident to arrest in this case was also 
complicated by the fact that there were other people in the 
apartment. When the Deputies entered into the bedroom, Corinna was 
laying on the bed. Corinna7s sister and her boyfriend were also in 
the apartment. Where Deputies believed there could be a weapon in 
the bedroom, and people still had access to the bedroom, they acted 
reasonably when they conducted a limited search for weapons. 
The state also notes that in almost every search incident to 
arrest where the person is arrested in an automobile, that person 
is removed from the automobile before the search is conducted, and 
those searches are held valid. 
POINT III. 
The controlled substances that were found, were in plain view. 
After Defendant was placed under arrest and searched, he was 
moved into the front room of the apartment. When Deputy Hartley 
found a gun in the bedroom, Deputy Zwemke went back into the 
bedroom to help in the search incident to arrest. While Deputy 
Zwemke was looking for guns in the closet, he noticed a metal 
container without a lid. Inside that metal tin he observed a metal 
tube, other paraphernalia, and five small plastic bags containing 
white powdery substances that he believed to be control substances. 
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Inside that container was a copy of Defendant's birth certificate. 
In the case of States v. Homes, 774 P.2d 506, 510 (Utah App. 
1989), the Utah Court of Appeals held that one exception to the 
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment is when an object is 
within the plain view of the officer. The court held that "the 
plain view exception requires: (1) lawful presence of the officer; 
(2) evidence in plain view; and (3) evidence which is clearly 
incriminating." Id.; State v. Bartley. 784 P.2d 1231, 1235 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
In the present case, Deputy Zwemke was lawfully in the bedroom 
conducting a search incident to arrest. The purple metal tin was 
in plain view of Deputy Zwemke. Deputy Zwemke testified at the 
Preliminary Hearing that the tin container did not have a lid on it 
and the contents were visible. The contents were also clearly 
incriminating. The tin contained a metal tube, other 
paraphernalia, and five small plastic bags containing white powdery 
substances, that Deputy Zwemke believed were controlled substances. 
Those substances were later tested by the Crime Lab and shown to be 
Cocaine and Methamphetamine residue. 
POINT IV. 
The State's Burden at a Hearing on a Motion to Suppress is no more 
than a Preponderance of the Evidence. 
The State's Burden at a suppression hearing is no more that a 
preponderance of the evidence. State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4 (Utah 
App. 1994). 
CONCLUSION 
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OGDEN, UTAH OCTOBER 19, 1995 2:00 P.M. 
THE COURT: STATE OF UTAH VERSUS JOSEPH GALLEGOS. 
MR. GRAVIS: DAVID GALLEGOS, YOUR HONOR. THE COURT 
HAS --
THE COURT: DAVID GALLEGOS, ISN'T IT? 
MR. GRAVIS: YES. HAS THE COURT LISTENED TO THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING TAPE? 
THE COURT: I DID HEAR IT. 
MR. GRAVIS: YES, YOUR HONOR. FIRST OFF, THIS IS OUR 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS. AND THE COURT HAS HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO 
REVIEW THE MEMORANDUMS. THE STATE HAS CHOSEN NOT TO ADDRESS 
THE ISSUES I'VE PRESENTED TO THIS MOTION AND SIMPLY ARGUED 
THIS UNDER A FEDERAL FIFTH AMENDMENT, FOURTH AMENDMENT 
ARGUMENT. IT'S OUR POSITION THAT UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTION 
AND STATE STATUTE, TITLE 77-7-9, THAT THE EVIDENCE SHOULD BE 
SUPPRESSED AS ILLEGAL SEARCH. IT'S OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE 
STATUTE AND WOULD BE UNREASONABLE SEARCH UNDER THE ARTICLE ONE 
SECTION 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
SECONDLY, THE STATE'S OPPOSITION, IT WOULD BE OUR 
POSITION THAT EVEN UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT, WHEN YOU LOOK AT 
OUR MEMORANDUM WHEN WE TALK ABOUT CONCERNING STATE VERSUS 
HYMAS AND STATE VERSUS LAROCCO WHERE IN HYMAS IT -- JUSTICE 
ZIMMERMAN IN A CONCURRING OPINION STATED, ONCE THE THREAT THAT 
THE SUSPECT WILL INJURE AN OFFICER WITH A CONCEALED WEAPON, 
THERE IS NO PERSUASIVE REASON WHY THE OFFICER CANNOT TAKE THE 
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TIME TO SECURE A WARRANT. SUCH A REQUIREMENT WOULD PRESENT 
LITTLE IMPEDIMENT TO POLICE INVESTIGATIONS, ESPECIALLY IN 
LIGHT OF THE EASE IN WHICH WARRANTS COULD BE COULD BE OBTAINED 
UNDER UTAH'S WARRANT STATUTE. THAT WAS A CONCERN, AND THE 
ISSUE HAS BEEN CITED WITH APPROVAL IN LAROCCO. THOUGH IT'S 
NOT BEEN DECLARED THE LAW BY THE SUPREME COURT, IT'S CERTAINLY 
A CLEAR INDICATION THAT THAT IS WHERE THE COURT IS LEANING. 
IN PARTICULAR, THIS CASE, THE TESTIMONY ON THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING FROM DETECTIVE ZWEMKE AND DETECTIVE --
DEPUTY HARTLEY CONCERNING WHERE MR. GALLEGOS WAS AT, DETECTIVE 
OR DEPUTY ZWEMKE STATED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT MR. GALLEGOS WAS 
REMOVED FROM THE BEDROOM AND TAKEN TO THE FRONT ROOM AT THE 
TIME. DEPUTY HARTLEY, WHO DID THE SEARCH SAYS, I BELIEVE HE 
WAS OUT OF THE ROOM AFTER -- AFTER HE CHECKED THE MATTRESS, 
THEN WENT ON FURTHER TO SAY HE WAS OUT OF THE ROOM BEFORE OR 
HE WAS OUT --ON HIS WAY OUT OF THE ROOM CLOSE IN TIME. HE 
COULD HAVE BEEN ON HIS WAY OUT. SO THERE'S SOME QUESTION 
EXACTLY WHERE MISTER -- DEPUTY HARTLEY'S TESTIMONY AS TO WHERE 
MR. GALLEGOS WAS WHEN THE GUN WAS FOUND. DEPUTY ZWEMKE 
SPECIFICALLY INDICATED HE WAS --
THE COURT: DOESN'T THE LAW TALK ABOUT NOT WHERE HE 
WAS WHEN THE SEARCH OCCURRED, BUT WHERE HE WAS WHEN HE WAS 
ARRESTED? 
MR. GRAVIS: WELL, HYMAS TALKS ABOUT WHERE HE WAS 
WHEN THE SEARCH OCCURRED, NOT WHERE THE ARREST OCCURRED. AS I 
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STATED, THAT'S IN THE CONCURRING OPINION OF JUSTICE ZIMMERMAN, 
WHICH HAS BEEN CITED WITH APPROVAL IN THE MAJORITY OPINION OF 
LAROCCO, BUT IT IS NOT A HOLDING. MY ARGUMENT UNDER 77-7-9 
SAYS, WHERE -- THAT THEY CAN SEIZE WEAPONS ON OR ABOUT THE 
PERSON SEIZED. AND ON OR ABOUT IS -- MEMORANDUM GOES ON TO 
DEFINE ON OR ABOUT IS THE AREA WITHIN THE IMMEDIATE REACH OF 
THE DEFENDANT WITH LITTLE PHYSICAL EFFORT REQUIRED TO REACH 
IT. AND I'VE CITED CASES FROM OTHER STATES PLUS THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT DECISION DEALING WITH CONCEALED WEAPONS, WHICH 
HAS HELD THAT THAT -- WHAT IT MEANS, WHICH IS A MUCH MORE 
LIMITED AREA. AND I THINK THAT UNDER -- WHERE THE FACTS THAT 
HE WAS ON THE WAY OUT OF THE ROOM OR OUT OF ROOM WHEN THE 
SEARCH OCCURRED, THERE'S NO LONGER ON OR ABOUT HIM. AND IN 
ANY EVENT, THE DRUGS THAT WERE FOUND, IT'S CLEAR HE'S OUT OF 
THE ROOM. THERE'S NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THAT HE WAS ANYWHERE 
CLOSE TO THEM WHEN HE WAS SEIZED. 
THE COURT: WHAT ABOUT THE THRESHOLD QUESTION OF 
ABOUT WHETHER THERE WAS ANY LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY? 
MR. GRAVIS: YOUR HONOR, THAT IS THE STANDING ISSUE 
THAT WE HAVE AGREED LAST TIME TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER THIS HEARING 
TO DETERMINE WHETHER WE'RE GOING TO ADDRESS THAT. I WAS GOING 
TO FURTHER BRIEF IT, AND WE FILED A MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY 
OF THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT, SO THAT ISSUE IS NOT BEFORE THE 
COURT TODAY. 
THE COURT: WELL, I WAS NOT AWARE OF THAT. AND I 
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RECALL YOUR LAST TIME YOU WERE HERE THAT WE TALKED ABOUT SOME 
LIMITATION ON THIS, BUT I DIDN'T REMEMBER WHAT THAT WAS. I 
ASKED MY CLERK TO FIND OUT WHAT -- BUT IT SEEMS KIND OF -- AND 
I DON'T WANT TO GIVE OFFENSE, BUT IT SEEMS KIND OF SILLY TO BE 
TALKING ABOUT SOME OF THESE OTHER ISSUES IF THERE IS JUST A 
THRESHOLD QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE WAS STANDING FOR HIM TO 
MAKE THAT KIND OF ARGUMENT. 
MR. GRAVIS: WELL, YOUR HONOR, THERE'S SEVERAL 
ARGUMENTS WHY HE HAS STANDING, AND I WOULD SUBMIT THAT WE 
HAVE, NUMBER ONE, THEY HAVE -- THEY'RE -- THE POLICE OFFICERS 
THEMSELVES WOULD TESTIFY THAT THERE WERE MORE THAN ARTICLES OF 
PERSONAL PROPERTY FOUND IN MR. GALLEGOS -- FOUND IN -- ON 
THE --IN THE AREA WHERE THAT BEDROOM OF THAT RESIDENCE. YOU 
DON'T CUT A HOLE IN THE FLOOR OF SOMEBODY'S HOUSE WHEN YOU ARE 
JUST MAKING A -- TO MAKE A HIDING SPOT IF YOU'RE JUST MAKING A 
CASUAL VISIT AND HIDE TO REMOVE PART OF THE FLOORBOARDS. 
THE COURT: OF COURSE I DON'T KNOW THAT AT ALL. ALL 
I KNOW IS HE EMERGED OUT OF A HOLE. 
MR. GRAVIS: WELL, THERE WAS A FLOOR, THERE WAS 
OBVIOUSLY A HIDING SPOT UNDERNEATH THE CARPET, HOLE CUT IN THE 
FLOOR WHERE HE WAS HIDING, AND HE OBVIOUSLY KNEW ABOUT IT. 
AND THE NUMEROUS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS WHO TOLD THE POLICE 
OFFICERS THAT THAT'S WHERE HE WAS RESIDING. 
THE COURT: WELL, IS THAT YOUR AGREEMENT WITH THE 
DEFENDANT? 
7 
TIME, THAT'S BASED UPON OUR AGREEMENT PREVIOUSLY, IT'S NOT 
BEFORE THE COURT. 
THE COURT: GO AHEAD, FINISH YOUR ARGUMENT PLEASE. 
MR. GRAVIS: I -- AT THIS TIME I'LL RESERVE WHATEVER 
ARGUMENT FOR REBUTTAL WITH -- BUT LIKE I SAY, THE STATE'S 
CHOSEN SIMPLY TO IGNORE MY ARGUMENT, CASE LAW'S PRESENT, THE 
STATUTE'S PLAIN ON ITS FACE. PROPERTY MAY BE SEIZED WHICH IS 
ON OR ABOUT THE DEFENDANT WHEN SEIZED. THAT'S 77-7-9 WHICH 
HAS BEEN ON THE BOOKS CLEAR BACK TO 1898 AND HAS NEVER BEEN 
INTERPRETED BY ANY COURT AND -- AND IT'S OUR POSITION THAT 
THAT IS A LIMITATION ON THE RIGHT TO SEARCH PURSUANT TO 
ARREST. THAT'S THE PURPOSE OF A SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST IS 
TO DISCOVER WEAPONS OR EVIDENCE OF A CRIME WHICH CAN BE 
CONCEALED OR EASILY DESTROYED. AND THE LEGISLATURE HAS TAKEN 
THE POSITION THAT MEANS ON OR ABOUT THE PERSON. SEARCH FOR 
WEAPONS AND -- AND IT'S OUR POSITION THAT WHEN THEY TOOK HIM 
OUT OF THE ROOM, HE WAS NO LONGER CLOSE TO THE GUN AND THERE 
WAS NEVER -- THERE'S ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE HE WAS EVER NEAR 
THE DRUGS. THEY WERE FOUND IN THE CLOSET. THERE WAS NO 
EVIDENCE THAT HE WAS IN THE CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE CLOSET. SO 
IT'S OUR POSITION THAT UNDER UTAH LAW THAT'S MUCH MORE 
RESTRICTIVE THAN FEDERAL LAW UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND 
THE SEARCH IS ILLEGAL. AND AGAIN, WE WOULD SUBMIT THAT EVEN 
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, BASED UPON THE HYMAS AND THE 
LAROCCO CASES, THAT STILL WOULD BE AN ILLEGAL SEARCH. 
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THE COURT: IN LISTENING TO THE PRELIMINARY HEARING 
EVIDENCE, THOUGH, I THINK THE TESTIMONY WAS NOT UNEQUIVOCALLY 
CLEAR THAT HE WAS OUT OF THE ROOM. IT MAY HAVE BEEN THAT HE 
WAS LEAVING THE ROOM. IS THAT CORRECT? 
MR. GRAVIS: HE MAY -- ONE OFFICER COULDN'T SAY 
WHETHER HE WAS OUT OF THE ROOM OR NOT. THE OTHER OFFICER 
STATED -- AND I HAVE A COPY OF THE -- I HAD A TRANSCRIPT 
PREPARED OF THAT SHORT PORTION OF THE --OF THE PRELIMINARY 
HEARING TAPE. OFFICER ZWEMKE TESTIFIED HE WAS OUT OF THE 
ROOM. DEPUTY HARTLEY WAS SOMEWHAT UNSURE WHETHER HE WAS OUT 
OF THE ROOM OR ON HIS WAY OUT OF THE ROOM. OR WHETHER HE 
WAS --
THE COURT: THANK YOU. YOU MAY RESPOND. 
MR. SAUNDERS: THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. DEPUTY 
HARTLEY DID SAY THAT NO MATTER WHEN IT TOOK PLACE, IT WAS VERY 
CLOSE IN TIME TO THE TIME THE SEARCH OCCURRED. THIS SEARCH 
OCCURRED IMMEDIATELY UPON -- AFTER THE PLACE WAS SECURED, AND 
AS HE WAS LEAVING THE ROOM, DEPUTY HARTLEY WENT IMMEDIATELY TO 
THIS MATTRESS WHERE DAVID HAD BEEN REACHING AT THE TIME HE 
CAME OUT OF THE HOLE, AND DISCOVERED A LOADED WEAPON THERE. 
IT'S OUR POSITION, YOUR HONOR, THIS IS A VALID SEARCH INCIDENT 
TO ARREST. AS STATED UNDER BELL VERSUS LOUISIANA, IT'S NOT --
IT DOESN'T MATTER WHERE THE DEFENDANT IS AT THE TIME OF THE 
SEARCH; IT MATTERS WHERE THE DEFENDANT WAS AT THE TIME OF HIS 
ARREST. AND AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST HE WAS IN CLOSE 
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PROXIMITY TO THIS WEAPON. AND THAT'S OUR ARGUMENT. 
THE ARGUMENT ON THE DRUGS ISN'T THAT HE IS IN CLOSE 
PROXIMITY TO THOSE. THAT IS, UNDER A VALID SEARCH INCIDENT TO 
ARREST, THESE DRUGS WERE IN PLAIN VIEW OF AN OFFICER. DEPUTY 
ZWEMKE TESTIFIED THAT AS HE WAS LOOKING IN THE BEDROOM, HE 
OBSERVED THIS TIN THAT DIDN'T HAVE A LID ON IT THAT WAS OPEN. 
HE OBSERVED SOME CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES IN THAT TIN AND ALSO A 
BIRTH CERTIFICATE, COPY OF A BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF DAVID 
GALLEGOS. 
AND, YOUR HONOR, YOU'VE READ THE MEMORANDUM AND LISTENED 
TO THE PRELIMINARY HEARING TAPE. THAT'S BASICALLY OUR 
ARGUMENT. IF YOU HAVE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS THAT I COULD ADDRESS 
FOR YOU, I'LL SUBMIT IT WITH THAT. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. ANY RESPONSE? 
MR. GRAVIS: WELL, YOUR HONOR, I DON'T THINK IT'S A 
FACTUAL ISSUE, AT LEAST TO THIS POINT. I THINK IT'S -- MR. 
SAUNDERS WOULD AGREE THAT -- THAT WHEN THE SEARCH FOUND DRUGS, 
THERE WAS NO QUESTION THAT MR. GALLEGOS WAS OUT OF THE ROOM. 
AND AS I STATED, STATE HAS ARGUED FIFTH AMENDMENT, FOURTH 
AMENDMENT. WE HAVE ARGUED STATE LAW AND STATE CONSTITUTION. 
AND IT'S OUR POSITION THAT -- THAT LIKE I SAY, WE'RE NOT 
WAIVING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT BUT FOURTH AMENDMENT ARGUMENT 
UNDER -- BECAUSE OF THE HYMAS AND LAROCCO CASE. BUT WE'RE 
TAKING THE POSITION UNDER STATE LAW, THERE'S -- IT'S MUCH MORE 
RESTRICTIVE THAN THAT TEST OF TO BE ON OR ABOUT, SO ANY SEARCH 
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THAT FOUND THE DRUGS ARE CLEARLY NOT A SEARCH INCIDENT TO 
ARREST UNDER STATE LAW. AND IT'S OUR POSITION THAT ONCE HE'S 
REMOVED, WAS REMOVED FROM THE ROOM WHERE -- REMOVED FROM THE 
CLOSE PROXIMITY OF THE ARREST WHERE HE WASN'T -- WHERE HE WAS 
AT WHEN HE WAS ARRESTED THAT THAT SEARCH AGAIN WAS NOT A 
SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST AND WITHOUT A WARRANT WAS ILLEGAL. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. COURT WILL RULE THAT THE 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION UNDER SECTION 77-7, THE ABOUT HIS 
PERSON MEANS THE AREA THAT IS WITHIN THE DEFENDANT'S REACH AT 
THE TIME OF THE ARREST, NOT THE SEARCH. AND THAT IT MAY BE 
SEARCHED INCIDENT TO AN ARREST TO ASCERTAIN THE EXISTENCE OF A 
WEAPON. THEREFORE, THE COURT DENIES THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
THE FINDING OF THE WEAPON. 
COURT ALSO RULES THAT THE DRUGS FOUND IN THE TIN WERE IN 
PLAIN VIEW OF THE OFFICER WHO ENTERED LAWFULLY. AND THAT THE 
EVIDENCE WAS CLEARLY INCRIMINATING ON ITS FACE. FOR THAT 
REASON, THAT EVIDENCE ALSO IS NOT SUPPRESSED. 
MR. GRAVIS: YOUR HONOR, IT'S OUR MOTION AT THIS TIME 
TO RENEW OUR MOTION TO COMPEL THE DISCOVERY AND CONFIDENTIAL 
INFORMANT. BECAUSE AS I STATED, STILL THE ISSUE OF STANDING, 
UNLESS THE STATE WANTS TO WAIVE IT, WOULD BE -- NEED TO BE 
ADDRESSED ON APPEAL. DOESN'T MAKE ANY SENSE TO TAKE IT UP ON 
APPEAL AND COME BACK AND ADDRESS THE STANDING ISSUE. 
MR. SAUNDERS: YOUR HONOR, WE'RE NOT WILLING TO TURN 
OVER THOSE NAMES AT THIS POINT. IF THE COURT WOULD LIKE TO 
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YOU SAID YOU TOLD HIM A COUPLE TIMES TO GET HIS HANDS UP, WHAT 
DID DO YOU THEN? 
A AFTER HE COMPLIED? 
Q YEAH. 
A AFTER MR. GALLEGOS FINALLY COMPLIED, I TOOK MR. GALLEGOS 
INTO CUSTODY. AT THAT TIME I HANDCUFFED HIM AND SEARCHED HIM. 
Q AND THEN YOU TOOK HIM OUT OF ROOM? 
A YES, I DID. 
Q OKAY. YOU SAID YOU WEREN'T PRESENT WHEN THE DEPUTY 
HARTLEY ALLEGEDLY FOUND THE FIREARM? 
A NO, I WAS NOT. 
Q OKAY. NOW, LET ME SEE THE BOX. THE — 
MR. SAUNDERS: THE SYRINGE IS HERE IF YOU'D LIKE THAT. 
BY MR. GRAVIS: 
Q DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO THIS BOX. YOU SAY YOU FOUND IT IN 
THE CLOSET? 
A UH-HUH. 
Q WHERE IS IT AT IN THE CLOSET? 
A THERE'S A SHELF, THERE WAS A SHELF ON THE CLOSET. I 
FOUND IT ON THE SOUTHWEST -- WELL, IT WOULD BE ON THE SOUTH 
PORTION OF THE CLOSET. IF YOU'RE STANDING IN FRONT OF THE 
CLOSET, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN ON THIS TOP LEFT-HAND SIDE. 
Q HOW DID YOU PICK IT UP? 
A I JUST PICKED IT UP LIKE THIS. 
Q AND THEN WHAT YOU DID DO WITH IT? 
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ll A THEN LOOKED INTO IT. SEE WHAT WAS IN THERE. 
2 Q OKAY. NOW, WHY DID YOU PICK IT UP AND LOOK INSIDE OF IT? 
31 A LIKE I SAID, WE WERE MAKING SURE THAT THERE WAS NO OTHER 
4 WEAPONS WITHIN THE ROOM. 
51 Q OKAY. WHEN YOU PICKED IT UP, WAS IT LIKE IT IS NOW? 
6I A BASICALLY, YES. THERE WAS NO LID ON IT. 
7 Q OKAY. AND YOU ACTUALLY HAD TO PICK IT UP BEFORE YOU 
8 COULD LOOK INSIDE OF IT? 
9 A WELL, YEAH. IT WAS KIND OF UP ON A SHELF. I COULDN'T — 
10 WASN'T TALL ENOUGH TO SEE UP ON TOP THERE. 
Ill Q OKAY. SO WHEN YOU PICKED IT UP, YOU COULD FEEL ITS 
12 WEIGHT. 
13 A WELL, YEAH. 
14 Q DID IT FEEL LIKE IT HAD ANY WEAPONS IN IT? 
15 A I DIDN'T KNOW UNTIL I LOOKED. 
16 Q OKAY. DIDN'T FEEL HEAVY ENOUGH TO HAVE A GUN IN IT. 
17 A PROBABLY NOT HEAVY ENOUGH FOR A GUN, NO. 
18 Q WASN'T BIG ENOUGH TO PUT A VERY BIG KNIFE IN IT, RIGHT? 
19 A NO, BUT — 
20 Q OKAY. NOW, AFTER YOU PICKED IT UP AND YOU LOOKED INSIDE 
21 OF IT, WHAT DID YOU DO WITH THE BOX? 
22 A AFTER I LOOKED, WHEN I GRABBED IT, I LOOKED DOWN AND 
23 LOOKED TO SEE WHAT WAS IN THERE, THE CONTENTS, AND THAT'S WHEN 
24 I NOTICED THESE LITTLE BAGGIES THAT WERE LAYING IN THE BOTTOM 
25 OF THE BOX. AND THAT'S WHEN I SAID, WHOSE IS THIS BOX? AND 
